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CASE COMMENTS
curs whether or not the subjacent owner has violated his duty to sup-
port. It further eliminates the problem of awarding speculative dam-
ages for future subsidence that may or may not occur. Also, since each
separate cave-in gives rise -to a new cause of action, a recovery for new
subsidence is not barred by the principle of res judicata. This is true
even when the new subsidence results from the same act of mining that
caused a previous cave-in for which the surface owner has already re-
covered.
LEONARD SARGEANT, III
FALSE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND
BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGES
A discharge has been granted in bankruptcy proceedings for more
than two centuries.' Discharge provisions have varied in terms and
application. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which is the basis of the
present Act, provided for the debtor's discharge from further obliga-
tion on his debts upon meeting tertain strict conditions.2 Section
14(a) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as now amended, shows the lib-
eral trend in favor of discharge by providing ,that adjudication as a
bankrupt shall be tantamount to an application for a discharge. 3 Sec-
tion 14(c) further provides that the granting of a discharge is manda-
tory if the bankrupt is not guilty of any of the enumerated grounds for
a denial.4 Section 14(c)(3), probably the most frequently used ground
for denial, was greatly liberalized in favor of the bankrupt by amend-
ment in 196o.5 Under the amended section a person may receive a dis-
"'[A]nd be it further enacted ... shall be discharged from all debts by him...."
4th Anne, ch. 17 (1705) for historical discussion see Remington, Bankruptcy § 5
(5th ed. 1950).
2Collier, Bankruptcy § 14.01 (14 th ed. 1962); Remington, Bankruptcy § 2993 (6th
ed. 1955).
3"(a) The adjudication of any person, except a corporation, shall operate as
an application for a discharge:" Bankruptcy Act § 14(a), 52 Stat. 850 (1938), 11
U.S.C. § 32(a) (1958); Remington, Bankruptcy § 2995 (6th ed. 1955).
"'(c) The court shall grant the discharge unless satisfied that the bankrupt
has...." (emphasis added), Bankruptcy Act § 14(c), 52 Stat. 850 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §
32(c) (1958).
5(c) The court shall grant a discharge unless .... (3) [while engaged in business
as a sole proprietor, partnership, or as an executive of a corporation,] obtained
[for such business] money or property on credit or as an extension or renewal of
credit by making or publishing or causing to be made or published in any manner
whatsover, a materially false statement in writing respecting his financial condition
[or the financial condition of such partnership or corporation;]" (language added
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charge in certain instances notwithstanding that he has obtained credit
or procured an extension thereof through the use of a materially false
written financial statement. However, the discharge is limited since sec-
tion 17(a)(2) was also amended in i96o to provide that although a dis-
charge is granted, a debt incurred by fraudulent means is not dis-
charged.6
In the Matter of Simms" is a case of first impression involving the
ig6o amendment. The bankrupt was a tenant farmer, who used his
own machinery in operating a farm for another person. The owner
and the bankrupt divided the profits. The bankrupt obtained a loan of
$6oo from the Seaboard Finance Company, who relied on the bank-
rupt's materially false written financial statement. Another creditor
relying on section 14(c)(3) objected to the bankrupt's discharge. The
court nevertheless granted the discharge on the grounds that the 196o
amendment to this section was intended to relieve the harshness of the
old provision towards a bankrupt who is engaged in a noncommercial
activity, as distinguished from one who is involved in commerce.8
Thus, according to -this court's interpretation, a bankrupt not en-
gaged in commercial activity will be granted his discharge to all debts
except ,the one which, under section 17(a)(2), was fraudulently incur-
red.9
Prior -to the 196o amendment section 14(c)(3) was particularly harsh
on -the bankrupt. If a creditor could show that the bankrupt had made
a materially false written financial statement, and that credit had been
given in reliance thereon, a discharge was denied as to all debts.10
by amendment in brackets), Bankruptcy Act § 14(c)(3), 52 Stat. 850 (1938), amended
by 74 Stat. 408 (196o), as amended, xi U.S.C. § 32(c)(3) (Supp. II 196o); S. Rep. No.
1688, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2954 (196o).
6"(a) A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable
debts, whether in full or in part, except such as...
" (2) are liabilities for obtaining money or property by false pretenses or false
representations, or for obtaining money or property on credit or obtaining an
extension or renewal of credit in reliance upon a materially false statement in
writing respecting his financial condition made or published or caused to be made
or published in any manner whatsover with the intent to deceive....", Bank-
ruptcy Act X 17(a)(2), 52 Stat. 851 (1918), amended by 74 Stat. 409 (sg6o), as
amended, ix U.S.C. § 35(a)(2); (Supp. II 196o); S. Rep. No. 1688, 86th Cong. 2d
Sess. p. 2956 (1960).
'202 F. Supp. 911 (E.D. Va. 1962).
'For discussions of what constitutes "commerce," see, United States v. Besser
Mfg. Co., 96 F. Supp. 304 (E.D. Mich. 1951); Young v. Kellex Corp., 82 F. Supp.
953 (E.D. Tenn. 1948); City of Topeka v. Jones, 74 Kan. 164, 86 Pac. 162 (1906). But
see, United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc., 343 U.S. 326 (1952); 7 A Words &
Phrases, Commerce (perm. ed. 1952).
9See note 6 supra.
20In re Prout, 74 F. Supp. 889 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
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Thus a creditor who knew nothing about the financial statement and
therefore was not deceived, benefited from the denial as well as the
one who was fraudulently induced to make the loan."
The elements outlined in section 14 (c)(3) which are requisite for a
denial of discharge remain in force:' 2 the statement must be in writing,
it must be materially false, credit or an extension of credit or prop-
erty must have been obtained in reliance on the false statement, and
the bankrupt must have published or caused the statement to be pub-
lished. The amendment, however, makes section 14(c) (3) inapplicable
to the bankrupt who does not obtain money or property for commer-
cial purposes. 13
Generally the courts have strictly construed the provisions of sec-
tion 14(c)(3). The requirement that the statement must be in writing
has apparently presented no problem. 14 The other elements, however,
are more complex. The determination of what is materially false'
5
has caused some difficulty, and one court has gone so far as to hold
that an understatement of a debt of less than $250 in an application
for a $3oo loan is a sufficiently material falsification to justify a de-
nial of the discharge. 16 If the other requisites are met, any reliance
by a creditor is sufficient to deny a discharge. 7 The fact that there
has been an independent investigation by the creditor does not nec-
essarily show lack of reliance.'8 Moreover, the statement does not
need ,to have been made to the objecting creditor,' 9 so long as there
"In re Prout, 74 F. Supp. 889 (S.D. Gal. 1947); In re Henahan, 32 F. Supp.
278 (NJ). Ill. 1940); In re Easthan, 51 F.2d 287 (S.D. Tex. 1931).
"See note 5 supra.
"Bankruptcy Act 14(c)(3), 52 Stat. 850 (1938), amended by 74 Stat. 4o8 (1960),
as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 32(c)(3) (Supp. II 196o); Collier, Bankruptcy § 14.36 (4th
ed. 1962).
"Mau v. Sampsell, 185 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1956).
15Morimura, Arai & Co. v. Taback, 279 U.S. 24 (1929); Morris Plan Industrial
Bank v. Parker, 143 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1944); In re McGillis, 40 F.2d 268 (loth Cir.
193o); Compare, Wylie v. Ward, 292 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1961).
161n re West, 158 F.2d 858 (7th Cir. 1946).
'-Banks v. Siegel, 181 F.2d 3o9 (4 th Cir. 195o); Yates v. Boteler, 163 F.2d 953
(9th Cir. 1947). In re Philpott, 37 F. Supp. 43 (W.D. W. Va. 1940); In re Nonsch,
18 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Ky. 1937); In re Hochberg, 17 F. Supp. 916 (W.D. Pa. 1936);
Compare, Wylie v. Ward, 292 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1961); In re Little, 65 F.2d 777
(2d Cir. 1933); In re Day, 11 F. Supp. 400 (D. Mass. 1935).
"In re Applebaum, 11 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1926); In re Muscara, 18 F.2d 6o6 (W.D.
Pa. 1927).
"9Cunningham v. Elco Distribs., 189 F.2d 87 (6th Cir. 1951); In re Haggerty,
165 F.2d 977 (2d Cir. 1948); In re Arky, 138 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1943) (case where loan
was paid before adjudication); In re Leonard, 122 F. Supp. 214 (S.D. Cal. 1954); In
re Anderson, io4 F. Supp. 599 (E.D. Wis. 1952); In re Sheridan, 31 F. Supp. 286
( D.N.J. 194o); In re Weinstein, 34 IF.2d 964 (SMD. Cal. 1929).
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was reliance. 20 However, the fact that the false statement was written
and published by the bankrupt, and a creditor in fact did rely thereon
is not sufficient, standing alone, to deny a discharge. In addition to the
foregoing requisites the bankrupt must have intended to defraud the
creditor; 21 however, this intent may be implied when the evidence
shows ,that the bankrupt acted with reckless disregard as to the valid-
ity of the statement.22 Upon presenting evidence of these elements the
objecting creditor has presented a prima facie case thus putting the
burden on the bankrupt to exonerate himself.23 It follows that the
bankrupt is at somewhat of a disadvantage when the false statement
is introduced.
Thus ,the express purpose of the amendment is to limit the use of
a written false financial statement as a bar to a discharge. 24 The in-
tent of Congress in passing the amendment was threefold:2 5 Firstly, to
relieve the harshness of the unamended section on the noncommercial
bankrupt; Secondly, to prevent creditors who had no knowledge of
the false statement from benefiting by not having their claims dis-
charged, so that they retained a possibility of full payment in the fu-
ture or at least the opportunity of subjecting the debtor to harass-
ment; Thirdly, to retain the protection of section 17(a)(2) 2 6 for the
creditor who has been deceived.
While -the purposes of Congress are desirable, difficulty can arise in
determining the applicability of the amendment. The amended sec-
tion reads in part, "(3) while engaged in business as a sole proprietor,
partnership, or as an executive of a corporation, obtained for such
2In re Jaffee, 2o F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1927); Bank of Monroe v. Gleeson, 9 F.2d 520
(8th Cir. 1925); Rauch v. Manchester-Smith Co., 240 Fed. 687 (4 th Cir. 1917).
2In re Schwartz, 133 F.2d 216 (7th Cir. 1943); Baash-Ross Tool Co. v. Stephens,
73 F.2d 902 (gth Cir. 1934); In re Rosenfeld, 262 Fed. 876 (2d Cir. 1919); In re
Cleveland, 40 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. Mich. 1940)..
"WMorimura, Arai & Co. v. Taback, 297 U.S. 24 (1929); In re Santos, 211 F.2d
877 (7th Cir. 1954); David v. Annapolis Banking & Trust Co., 209 F.2d 343 (4th
Cir. 1953); In re Lovich, 117 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1941); Woolen Corp. v. Gitnig, 33
F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1929); In re Metcalf, 48 F. Supp. 405 (N.D. Tex. 1942); In re
Kellerman, 2 F. Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1932).
"Bankruptcy Act § 14(c)(7) 52 Stat. 850 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 32 (c)(7) (1958); In
re Berberich, 19o F.2d 53 (7th Cir. 1951); Morris Plan Industrial Bank v. Parker,
143 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1944); In re Finn, 119 F.2d 656 (3 d Cir. 1941); In re Smatlak,
99 F.2d 687 (7 th Cir. 1938); Federal Provision Co. v. Ershowsky, 94 F.2d 574 (2d
Cir. 1938).
"The purpose of the bill is to limit the use of false financial statements as
a bar to discharge in bankruptcy." S. Rep. No. 1688, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2954
(196o).
2S. Rep. No. 1688, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. p. 2954 (1960)-
"See note 6 supra.
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business money... by making or publishing.., in any manner what-
soever a materially false statement in writing respecting his financial
condition or the financial condition of such partnership or corpora-
tion; ' 27 Literally its applicability is limited to the situation in which
the loan is obtained by a person engaged in a commercal activity, to
be used for a business, i.e., for the purchase of new equipment, more
merchandise, new fixtures, expansion of the business itself, or for what-
ever the business as such needs.
Thus in a situation which involves a wage earner, retired person,
or tenant farmer, 28 the court would have no problem in deciding that
this class of person is without the scope of the amended section 14(c)(3).
By its express terms discharge is denied only to those who are engaged
in commerce and have obtained a loan for a commercial purpose. Ob-
viously this class is not engeged in commerce of any recognized type,
such as buying, selling, or trading merchandise. Therefore section
14(c)(3) has no application to this class, and if such persons do pub-
lish a false financial statement the creditor who relies thereon falls
within the scope of section 17(a)(2), but all other dischargeable debts
are discharged.
29
The more difficult problem arises in the situation in which the
debtor is a businessman. The primary question is, should the amend-
ed section be applicable -to the businessman who receives credit as an
individual and not for commercial purposes? The amended section
appears to answer this question in the affirmative by saying, "(3) while
engaged in business... obtained for such business...." Thus the dis-
charge is denied as to all debts, only if the loan is '"for" a business.
However, the statement of the intent of Congress seemingly speaks in
terms of individuals; "the individual noncommercial bankrupt" as
distinguished from the "business bankrupt," and "the financial state-
ment issued by a businessman is frequently for the purpose of estab-
lishing credit standing in the community."-3 0 Such statements could be
interpreted to mean that if one is a businessman or engaged in the
sale or purchase or trading of merchandise, and he obtains a loan
either on an individual basis or for his business; he does not receive
the protection of the amended section. It appears that such an inter-
zBankruptcy Act § 14(c)(3), 52 Stat. 850 (1938), amended by 74 Stat. 408 (196o),
as amended, i U.S.C. § 32(c)(3) (Supp. II 196o). (Emphasis added).
nAccording to 7A Words & Phrases, Commerce (perm. ed. 1962) professional
men are not engaged in commerce, and so may also be included.
nBankruptcy Act § 14(c)(3), 52 Stat. 850 (1938), amended by 74 Stat. 408 (196o);
as amended, ix U.S.C. § 32(c)(3) (Supp. II 1960); 17 (a)(2), 52 Stat. 851 (1938),
amended by 74 Stat. 409 (ig6o), as amended, ii U.S.C. § 35(a)(2) (Supp. II 1960).
nS. Rep. No. 1688, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. p. 2954 (196o).
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